Party Ties: Moderate Republicans’ Predicament
Last week, Freedom Caucus members blocked another a series of spending bills from reaching the House floor. Their opposition has stymied Speakers McCarthy and Johnson alike, forcing them to rely on Democratic votes to pass continuing resolutions and other must-pass legislation. These repeated failures raise questions about the possibility of a “new” majority that could govern. Specifically, many wonder when moderate Republicans will align with Democrats to chart a path forward on must-pass items. Given partisan polarization, this bipartisan coalition would likely not be the most ambitious in American history, but at least it would avoid the worst consequences of a non-functional Republican majority – i.e. government shutdowns, authorization lapses, etc. However, just because moderate Republicans have incentives to work with Democrats on these issues does not make defecting any easier for these members.
A cross-party governing coalition is not completely fan-fiction. Moderates’ competitive districts encourage a sober style of politics that shuns partisan hardball and irresponsible (and avoidable) legislative crises. Moderates’ political instincts are part of the reason bipartisan coalitions form every year to pass continuing resolutions, funding deals, among a host of other important bills (e.g. postal reform, CHIPS, Ukraine lend-lease, etc.). If the House Freedom Caucus (HFC) insists on reckless legislative tactics, why wouldn’t moderates work with Democrats to avoid self-imposed legislative crises?
For one, responsible legislating and ideological moderation only get members so far. Fashioning the right political style is an important part of any politician’s public persona. But arguing it is the reason moderates should shun their partisan affiliation and formally coordinate across the aisle suffers from a sort of ideological myopia that leans too heavily on policy positions as the means of reelection. In the process, we overlook the broader party apparatus, organization, and resources that aid their reelection campaigns and tie members to the party. What’s crucial to understand is the strength of those ties are not evenly distributed across House Republicans.
Parties dedicate money, staff, volunteers, and other resources to maximize their electoral chances. More often than not, competitive districts are more resource intensive than their safe seat counterparts. In competitive races, nominating the wrong candidate can cost the party in the general election. For example, Republicans were unable to defeat Democratic incumbent Marcy Kaptur (OH-09) in 2022 because they were unable to nominate their top candidates in the party primary. Instead, J.R. Majewski – who held fringe conspiracy views and was later found to have misrepresented his military record – won nomination but lost to Kaptur in the general. It is not surprising parties coordinate more in competitive districts to stave off or defeat primary challenges to ensure the “right” candidates win the nomination. Once nomination is secured, parties focus their resources on winning or holding the seat. For moderates, the path to reelection substantially runs through the party apparatus.
Safe seat members, by contrast, are not as reliant on party resources. Ideologically extreme members enjoy fundraising advantages that their moderate colleagues do not. The shift in campaign financing has benefited ideologically extreme members to the detriment of parties’ control. Likewise, party networks are not as coordinated in safe seats, creating a degree of autonomy moderates lack. Very conservative House members created political networks that are in many ways distinct from the Republican Party. Conservatives’ detachment from the “establishment” network means their political incentives actually run counter to the Republican Party’s. In sum, not only are conservatives more insulated from the party, their political interests incentivize opposition to that apparatus.
Put another way, moderate Republicans lack the political insulation their Freedom Caucus colleagues enjoy. Freedom Caucus members desert speakers with little concern for political repercussions. They are politically rewarded for their independence. Moderates, on the other hand, risk alienating the partisan networks they rely on to finance and run expensive reelection operations. In all, the members most ideologically inclined to align with Democrats are the same members who have the most to lose by formally working with them.
The public pines for bipartisanship. Unfortunately, the nationalized electoral environment, the realities of modern campaigns, and partisan animosity create a situation where bipartisanship only emerges after painful bickering, brinksmanship, and last-minute political deals. Ideologically, it would make sense for moderate Republicans to set aside the political insanity for more stable governing. But this lamentable routine is a product of members’ political incentives. For moderate House Republicans, breaking with the party carries a much higher cost than those causing the brinksmanship and dysfunction.