In late September, I went on C-SPAN’s Washington Journal to talk about the impending government shutdown. After a discussion with the program host, guests get to answer questions from viewers who call into the program. I expected to be challenged on something, but did not anticipate that on that list would be my positive characterization of federal employees, whom I’ve taught and worked with for many years. “You just said federal employees are hardworking and admirable. Can you explain to me why they’re more hardworking and admirable than the average American who doesn’t get paid when they are laid off?” I stood by my portrayal and said that I wasn’t trying to put anybody down by complimenting a different group. I’d like to give a fuller response here, because public opinion of the federal government and federal employees themselves (as well as some uninformed negative stereotypes) are part of a larger dynamic: public knowledge of government is essential for a functioning, informed democracy.
I’d also like to declare that while the rest of this piece will walk through a collection of scholarly and journalistic contributions to these larger questions, that I have my own perspective on this. I’ve been teaching federal employees about Congress for the Government Affairs Institute for a decade now, and I deeply believe in our mission of educating feds about Congress. We’re rooting for Congress to work well, and to have Congress work well with the Executive Branch. We teach all manner of courses, from introductory classes on congressional function, to specialized topics such as the budget and appropriations process, to research seminars, and more, while regularly engaging in public scholarship and discussion, whether it’s this newsletter, our podcast, or other outlets outside GAI.
My work has given me the opportunity to engage with thousands of federal employees. I’ve had students from many different agencies: from scientific researchers to military personnel who’ve risked their lives to save others, and every imaginable kind of public service in between a lab and a battlefield. They would be paid more in the private sector (not just individuals I’m proud to know, but the average federal employee with a bachelor’s degree or above) and may have made additional sacrifices (location, pertaining to family life, and more) to serve. I’m happy to declare that my bias is that I’m deeply impressed by their service and want to give them a hug or a high five.
Public Opinion Trends
How we think about federal employees and the federal government is important. It’s important for understanding what Americans demand from their government, and whether those demands are based on information that is accurate and complete enough for a healthy democracy.
American public opinion of federal employees is higher than their estimation of the federal government itself, and the public overwhelmingly believes a strong, nonpartisan merit-based civil service is essential to democracy. Federal employees enjoy approval often in the high 50s—versus the roughly 20% that trust the federal government to “do the right thing just about always/most of the time.” There is, of course, variation in both who approves of feds, but also which federal agencies receive the most public approval. Work by Don Moynihan as well as surveys by the Partnership for Public Service show agencies such as the National Park Service, Social Security Administration, CDC, NASA, USPS and the VA with the highest approval numbers, while ICE and the IRS have the lowest. [ENDNOTE #1]
What’s behind the public opinion trends
How should we understand all of this? The public values a strong, merit-based civil service and effective federal government, but bare majorities approve of federal employees (some agencies more than others) while the public has a strikingly low trust in the federal government.
There are a few things going on.
1) Government is less observable in the United States.
A number of factors make it harder for citizens to see how government policies and programs affect their lives. There is less direct social provision in the US than other OECD countries, where more of the population receive direct funds (cash transfers/ social transfers other than transfers in kind, e.g. educational or health benefits). More of American social provision is “hidden” because it is done through the tax code, whether that is by not paying taxes on health care benefits or the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, these are expenditures by the government on behalf of individuals lack the feeling of receiving a check in the mail (or receiving free or significantly discounted education or health care).
Another way of looking at these less visible government benefits is done by political scientist Suzanne Mettler, who expands on the above idea in her book The Submerged State, looking at the development of this very American welfare state as well as its manifestations for student aid, health care, and the tax code. She broadens her analysis in The Government-Citizen Disconnect, where she analyzes 21 major programs of social provision, does a polling analysis to see if people are aware they’re receiving government programs (they largely aren’t), and whether their vote is affected by the programs they receive or their beliefs about those programs (it largely isn’t, with “hidden” benefits given through the tax code being the most invisible to voters). The major exception she finds is that one’s view on TANF – “welfare”, often highly racially coded—being highly predictive of voting in elections. This disconnect is dangerous for an informed and responsive democracy.
2) Policy design itself can hamper benefits coming to citizens.
Citizens may dislike federal government because they DO observe it, of course, and have had difficult experiences. Citizens’ frustration with programs that are either insufficient or difficult to access is another important consideration. Scholars Pam Heard and Don Moynihan’s book Administrative Burden, as well as additional work, look at this larger concept of how bureaucracy, cumbersome paperwork, and complicated regulations can delay or prevent Americans from receiving benefits (and how it can be manipulated by policymakers seeking to limit benefits). Some of this is intentional policy design—but it can also be the complex interweaving of federal, state, and local overlapping and joint responsibilities, as well as the complexities of a grants-in-aid system.
The paucity of means-tested programs (where one’s income has to be low enough to receive the benefits), as well as difficulties in accessing multiple programs, are also important considerations. Andrea Campbell’s work explaining her sister-in-law’s tragic story shows the effect of policy on lives in a direct and compelling way.
3) Anti-government and anti-establishment messaging has been effective.
Trust in many American institutions (with notable exceptions for science and the military) has been declining since the 1960s.There are a number of lenses to view this through, including that major institutions (government, media, and academia) in this era were worthy of pushback (and society had generated a slew of social movements in response). It is also true that more concerted criticism has endured as a political strategy of those opposing government (and other institutions). While most of this enduring rhetoric has come from the right, it is not exclusively so, with both a range of more populist voices as well as those who gave at least partial lip service to this sort of rhetoric.
Of course, while policies and rhetoric can affect trust in government, trust can also affect what policies the public is willing to support: Marc Hetherington shows that, after rhetoric (from both parties) disparaging government, a distrust in the federal government pushes the public to have declining support for redistributive programs that could alleviate poverty and racial inequity.
4) Rules and institutional design limit federal employees publicizing their good work.
Federal agencies are both not designed to trumpet their successes, and can be actively prevented from doing so. Rules aimed at preventing propaganda (or mere “puffery”) in government agencies advertising their work (e.g. the Smith amendment and Gillett amendment) and other agency constraints do make it harder to identify what government is doing. (To be sure: these amendments are rarely legally enforced.) That said, these more nuanced points fit into the larger pattern of American government being less observable (reason #1, above). We are not in the era of FDR’s fireside chats and Works Progress Administration, where government action was loudly broadcasted.
A popular author that identifies that Americans are often unaware of the essential work done by federal agencies is Michael Lewis, with his book The Fifth Risk. (He’s subsequently also written Who Is Government?) He identifies the risks of undermining federal agencies, but also that rules that prevent federal employees from trumpeting their successes, as well as the complexities of programs and their agencies, also contribute to a lack of public information about those programs. For additional authors who also want to highlight the good work of federal employees, he’s contributed to the Washington Post’s series “Who Is Government?” (upon which the book is based), which also highlights the Samuel J. Heyman Service to America Medals (the “Sammies” are the “Oscars of public service”).
Recently two law professors have expounded on these concepts that federal agencies are constrained in promoting their successes while also being hindered by policy and agency complexity, tipping their hat to Mettler’s earlier work with the title “The Submerged Administrative State” (highlighted in this shorter post). While, in my view, this explanation is less consequential for its effect on public opinion than policy design or ideological broadsides (reasons #1-3 above), it belongs as a subcategory to the idea that government is less observable that helps us consider a wider range of government efforts beyond major social provision. (Michael Lewis highlights NOAA’s National Weather Service, DOE’s ARPA-E program, and various USDA programs.) I’m also happy to link to work that more directly considers and celebrates federal employees.
What’s not behind the public opinion trends:
1) The number of federal employees has not grown over the past few generations.
A common refrain is that government is “too big” and thus worthy of opposition or deserving of cuts. And while one cannot argue with someone’s feelings absent a metric (or perhaps individuals have specific programs or functions in mind), the number of federal employees has been relatively unchanged for the past fifty years (about 2 million)—even as the population, the economy, and government spending have all grown. What has grown during that time, to manage the additional workload, is the number of federal contractors as well as grantees. (This blended nature of the government workforce has prompted a variety of calls to increase, not decrease, federal employees rather than contract out their responsibilities.)
2) Federal employees in the civil service are not partisan actors.
There are a few ways one could attempt to consider the partisanship of the federal government—as well as some more critiques of political appointees (and not the civil service) that have merit.
First and foremost, it’s illegal for them to behave as partisan actors. Federal employees in the executive branch, under the Hatch Act, are prohibited from participating in political activities while on duty or in the workplace—and for those who are considered “further restricted” (many law enforcement and national security, as well as the FEC), they can’t take an active role in political activity even off duty (they may of course join groups, contribute money, vote). Such rules will extend to minutiae that most Americans wouldn’t imagine: whether it’s appropriate to decorate your office with historical campaign posters from generations ago (no), whether you can place an op-ed or other public writing on your area of expertise that has no partisan implications (could be tough or impossible, depends). This year has brought challenges to the law; 2025 will be addressed more fully at the end of this piece.
A broader historical take would identify that the professional, nonpartisan, competent civil servant is essential to our democracy and is seen that way by overwhelming (over 90%) majorities. This is a generations-long accomplishment: the basic civics lesson here would identify both the early patronage system where co-partisans were rewarded for their support with jobs, and pushback against the corruption inherent to such a state of affairs. The Pendleton Act of 1883 provided that jobs in the federal government were to be awarded competitively, based on merit, protected federal employees from political retaliation, and forbade them from engaging in political services or contribution. It initially covered 10% of all federal employees and has been subsequently extended over time to most positions. The Hatch Act added to these prohibitions in 1939 (and has seen more modern updating).
Some of the analysis that exists on the partisanship of federal employees (which, again, they can’t promote professionally) shows a diverse workforce. Data of 45% of federal employees from 1997-2019 show that about half (and thus a plurality) are Democrats, that more highly educated federal employees are even more likely to be Democrats (like the labor force in general), and that different agencies attract a different mix of liberals and conservatives (EPA is more liberal, DHS is more conservative). This study did not find that employees performed their jobs differently to advantage a political party—the only effect appears to be a minor loss of morale, among both Democrats and Republicans, when not aligned with the mission. The author, Xu, of the study states that of the 7,200 officers, administrating 700,000 contracts across 132 departments and agencies that they studied, that “We didn’t see any change in how people were choosing contractors or the types of contracts, so the decline in performance occurred while they were overseeing the contract…These overruns really do seem to be due to a decline in morale, which we corroborate through data from employee surveys.” [See ENDNOTE #2]
To the extent that serious reforms for federal employees have been promoted, one major example pertains to the growth of political appointees over time. This is seen in scholarly work: Lewis 2008 shows that presidents have increased the numbers of political appointees to bring agencies under closer control, at the sacrifice of some competence. This is also reflected in recommendations for policy from the Partnership for Public Service, which identifies that the sheer number of political appointees is too large and should be reduced.
To the extent that serious cost-saving measures for federal programs exist, GAO has published its “High Risk” list of programs since 1990, recommending changes. This is not the path that DOGE has taken.
Bringing this all back to the government shutdown: We need good federal employees and shutdowns hurt them.
Federal employees are the backbone of our government. Government shutdowns hurt a lot of things: while not all programs are affected (it varies), many specific programs and the people who need them, public goods in a broader sense, the economy, and more are hurt—but one of the biggest and most cohesive categories of harm is to federal employees, many of whom go without pay.
Economic costs to federal employees during a shutdown
About 750,000 federal employees were furloughed, working without pay, during the shutdown, while additional employees were “exempted”: working, but also without pay. This varies by agency. Of course, introducing that level of uncertainty for workers means that many have to scramble to make alternate plans or pick up additional work to feed their families, pay for housing, and more. The 35-day shutdown in 2019 was long enough that air traffic controllers and TSA started calling in sick so that they could find alternate work, famously causing backlogs at airports. We’re seeing the same dynamic in 2025, as well.
There are ways in which 2025 is not similar to 2019, of course. After the 2019 shutdown, Congress passed a law to ensure all federal employees would automatically be paid after a government shutdown, but in 2025 President Trump’s claims to the contrary put that in doubt, adding uncertainty for these workers (establishing that all would be paid is part of the legislation reopening government, but that wasn’t known until November 10).
This year is also different, as the White House has limited pain to military personnel by paying them out of a DoD research and development account (one that did not have transfer authority for such a move; as such an illegal violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act). But in most areas, the White House has taken action that made the shutdown more painful: firing 4,200 additional federal employees and fighting in court to withhold SNAP benefits. That, of course, comes in addition to what Daniel Schuman and Chris Nehls have called the “quiet shutdown” of federal programs prior to the actual government shutdown. Program and personnel cuts and reversals affect all citizens but feds are particularly injured by the bludgeonings of chance.
Professional costs to federal employees
Federal employees, like all professionals, seek stability, job security, and opportunities to do fulfilling work. Previous research (on the shorter and arguably less volatile 2013 shutdown) shows that feds who’ve experienced furloughs retire at higher rates. This year is arguably more traumatic to those trying to serve their country.
There is also a professional community cost, both to federal employees and the entire American public. The scientific community is a particularly acute case. They are affected by cuts to NIH and other agencies—grants and personnel, and challenges to places engaging in scientific research. This goes far beyond the shutdown to include many actions of the Trump Administration thus far. Citizens but also private industry benefit considerably from (just to pick one agency) NIH’s contributions, which are not always clear to the public. The current environment is such that 75% of scientists are considering moving abroad (according to a poll done by Nature). The EU, France, Norway, Australia, Canada, China, and more have ongoing efforts to welcome talent leaving America. (It should also be noted that the US has long been the country to attract talent from around the world; an advantage we appear to be in the process of losing.)
Conclusion
If you’re a federal employee reading this after coming back to work, thank you for your service. If you know a current or former fed, please thank them from us here at GAI. The Partnership for Public Service has a web page where you can write public messages to thank feds, as well.
In sum, it’s worth considering how the American public thinks about government (with low levels of trust, around 20%) and federal employees (considerably higher: high 50s, with some agencies doing better than others). This piece lays out some major research on why this is, from how government is less observable here in the US, to how policy design can hamper government benefits, to anti-government messaging, and (less significantly) how rules and institutional design can limit feds publicizing their work. It also considers factors that aren’t responsible: i.e. that the number of federal employees has not grown in 50 years, and that civil servants are not partisan actors. We’re in a time of considerable change, and understanding how we’ve gotten here, how the American people think of government, and what they might demand is important for where we go next. Protecting civil servants protects civil service. I’m proud to know many of you. Keep up the good work.
Endnotes:
Endnote #1:
A quick word on the IRS public opinion as someone who studies fiscal policy: it collects more revenue than its audits cost (the biggest bang for the buck being for the highest income brackets, who have also been audited far less over time), it suffers from long-term underfunding (the Inflation Reduction act contained a bipartisan effort to course correct—which has since seen its funding cut this year), and while people can have legitimate customer service grievances, these employees provide essential work under conditions that are often too difficult.
Endnote #2:
I chose to highlight Xu’s study both because it directly linked employee files and voter registration and had a nice summary and longer article that wasn’t behind a paywall, and had a lot of fairly recent data. That being said, other researchers have measured the partisanship of federal employees and agencies in a variety of ways, from executive perceptions, to the perceptions of experts outside government, to political donations, and more. See Richardson, Clinton, and Lewis 2018 for a more detailed discussion. See also Richardson 2024 for identifying that partisan disagreement over what the parties think an agency should do is not always linked to an agency’s ideological reputation, and highlighting that most of what federal agencies do is not ideological in nature. See Gailmard and Patty 2007 for identifying that security of job tenure and control over policy issues for policy-minded bureaucrats supported the development of an expert bureaucracy, which dovetails onto Xu’s point about the loss of morale when federal employees are not aligned with the mission.
There is, of course, a wealth of more nuanced political science work on theories of bureaucratic politics. I’m trying to limit this to a public-facing work engaging with common rhetoric, clearly identifying claims that don’t have merit, while getting into some of the (very rich!) literature on how Americans perceive their government.
