The Shutdown Continues: Notes from a House-Senate standoff

Tracking government funding, and particularly the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding has been unusually volatile and confusing this year. Given that Congress has already begun work on next year’s (FY27) appropriations bills with hearings (and the President’s budget has belatedly been released on April 3), it’s useful to nail down the DHS funding timeline, still incomplete for FY26. The partial government shutdown of DHS now surpasses this fall’s record of 43 days for a government shutdown. We can best understand the standoff by unpacking the timeline, the politics (including additional funding for ICE outside the appropriations process), and the incentives for party leadership as they stare each other down.

The Timeline:

DHS has now been operating under a partial lapse in appropriations for a record 52 days, since the expiration of P.L.119-75, an 11-day continuing resolution, on February 14th. Prior to that, DHS experienced a partial lapse in appropriations of four days—from January 31st to February 3rd, upon the expiration of P.L. 119-37, a continuing resolution enacted on November 12th, 2025, which ended the then-record 43-day government-wide lapse in appropriations. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) continue to operate as normal, with supplemental funding provided to the two agencies in P.L. 119-21, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA).

These three partial lapses–and the associated partial shutdowns–continue to have both policy and political implications. Democrats have thus far refused to provide full-year funding for ICE and CBP unless accompanied by policy reforms to immigration practices, pushing back in the direct aftermath of ICE shootings in Minneapolis, as public support for the agency and its funding drops. More congressional oversight, slow to start, has begun on ICE. Various proposals from both Democrats and the Trump administration have been discussed, but no agreements have been reached during the negotiations.

At the end of March, public service disruptions began to affect the politics. Most notably, long lines at many airport TSA checkpoints have begun to put political pressure on Congress to reach agreement on funding the Department. Last Friday, both the House and Senate approved legislation that would have ended the shutdown.

Unfortunately, they weren’t the same pieces of legislation.

The Politics:

At approximately 2:20am on Friday morning, March 27, the Senate passed by unanimous consent an amended version of H.R.7147, which contained a bipartisan compromise to provide full-year FY2026 appropriations for all DHS agencies except ICE and CBP (which can continue to operate on funds provided in the OBBBA.) The Senate bill would also authorize back pay for DHS employees working during the shutdown. It would leave negotiations over full-year CBP and ICE funding–as well as the disputed immigration enforcement policies–to future legislation.

This was transparently an attempt to “jam” the House—that is, to give them no option but agree to the Senate compromise. Moments after passing the bill, the Senate adjourned by unanimous consent until April 13, with just four pro forma sessions between now and then. By passing the bill and leaving town, the Senate handed the House an up-down decision: accept our compromise, or leave DHS shut for another two weeks.

Senate leadership probably figured the House would capitulate, because (a) the lines at TSA airport checkpoints had created a public backlash to the shutdown; (b) there was likely a huge bipartisan majority in the House to pass the compromise; and (c) jamming the House is a common Senate tactic, which usually succeeds.

This time, however, the House did not capitulate. Instead of voting to pass the Senate compromise now contained in H.R.7147, the House proposed an amendment to the bill, providing a two-month continuing resolution for all of DHS, which was agreed to by a 213-203 vote. Afterwards, the House adjourned under Speaker authority until April 13th, with only pro forma sessions until then. DHS remains partially shut down.

The Incentives for Party Leadership:

Why didn’t Speaker Johnson put the Senate compromise bill on the floor for a vote?

Likely because he was getting an earful from a sizeable percentage of his House GOP conference, many of whom were furious about the Senate deal.

This is a common problem for Speakers—being caught between a Senate deal that has the support of a majority (or even supermajority) of the House but significant opposition (or even majority opposition) within the majority party. Speakers need to maintain the backing of their conference, and it takes a lot of political capital to pass bills with the majority of your conference voting against them. Passing legislation with a majority of your conference has been dubbed the “Hastert rule”, but it’s also just good politics.

Why didn’t the supermajority in the House that favored the Senate compromise take action? They could have voted down the Speaker’s preferred legislation and made a play to substitute in the Senate deal.

One answer is that, in the modern House, the Speaker almost always has a partisan majority that gives him this deferential backing to create a procedural coalition. That is, backbench members vote in lockstep on procedural matters such as what bills to consider and what rules to consider them under, even if they are opposed to the actual legislation.

They do this because the benefits they receive from the party, such as committee assignments, electoral support, and the help of other party members on bills they do like, outweigh the small costs of occasionally having bills on the floor they oppose. Bucking the party on procedural votes is a serious transgression.

The House likely had the votes for either the Senate deal or for the Johnson House GOP alternative. But so long as his procedural coalition remained intact, Speaker Johnson had the choice of which one to put on the floor. His main concern was weighing the politics of the two options—substitute the two-month CR and leave DHS closed, or go with the Senate compromise and face the wrath of his caucus.

Where Do We Go From Here?

What happens next? The first week of April has seen additional fights between the House and Senate, as these same incentives continue to take hold. While the chambers are both scheduled to be out until April 13th, leaders have the authority to adjust the terms of the adjournments, so one or both chambers could return and agree to the other chamber’s proposal, or craft a new compromise. In theory, the president could also reconvene Congress under his constitutional authority, although he cannot force them to actually vote on anything.

More likely, DHS will continue to remain in partial shutdown for two weeks, and Congress will deal with the House-Senate disagreement when it returns. The president has also begun to pay TSA employees, claiming the authority to do this under various emergency statutes. While these authorities may be legally dubious, the political pressure relieved by paying the agents may lessen the urgency for Congress to return early and legislatively deal with the shutdown.